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Abstract 
 
The paper presented here is intended to provide an overview of some of the themes and issues linking 
theoretical and policy debates on media, democracy and public sphere, and to hopefully set the scene for further 
debate at the conference. The first part of the paper will compare and contrast normative models of media with a 
particular focus on their implicit conceptions of citizenship and civil society. The second part will map the 
emergent themes onto the shifts in public broadcasting policy in New Zealand under the Labour-led 
governments between 1999-2008. This will focus on the policy tensions that surrounded the development and 
implementation of the TVNZ Charter (which the current government has scheduled for ignominious abolition). 
The third part will endeavour to extend this analysis to the emergent broadcasting policy trajectory of the current 
National-led government. The conclusions will highlight the continuing policy salience of the conceptions public 
service and public sphere in policy debates and argue that even if these models need to be adapted to the digital 
multimedia environment, it would be premature to dispense with them altogether.  
 
Normative Models of Media 
 
Academic and policy debates about media systems are perennially contentious because even when informed by 
half a century of empirical research, the implications of that evidence are subject to different normative 
interpretations and implementations. Arguments concerning how mass media function in contemporary society 
depend not only on knowledge about their potential to influence the public in ostensibly desirable or undesirable 
ways, but on the assumptions about the public interest and the legitimate forms society could or should take.  
Johan Galtung‟s (1999) model of media and society is a useful starting point for the discussion here (see fig 1 
below). He characterises different social systems in terms of the relative priority afforded to three key 
subsystems, i.e. state, capital and civil society. The institutions comprising these different spheres operate 
according to distinctive and potentially conflicting „logics‟: State logic exhibits a preference for centralisation and 
control using coercive power, capital logic has a predilection for deregulation and profit-seeking and the 
expansion of economic power, while civil society‟s „people logic‟ reflects humanistic, lifeworld values and can 
mobilise moral power. Galtung then places the media system in the centre of these three subsystems and 
argues that this constitutes a critical nexus through which their relations are shaped: ‘Tell me how State, Capital 
and civil society dialogue with each other and I shall tell you what kind of society you have’ (1999, p.21). The 
model is evidently simplistic, and one might contend that it overstates the homogeneity and discreteness of the 
respective spheres and overlooks the potential for internal contradictions or alignments within and between 
them. Although the model does not provide an explanatory framework for specific social conditions, it 
nevertheless has two redeeming virtues: On an heuristic level, it invites important questions about the balance of 
relations among these spheres, and foregrounds the role of media systems in any explanation. Insofar as 
macro-economic changes since the 1970s have involved a prioritisation of deregulated market forces over 
national governments and a subordination of public services and welfare provisions to economic imperatives, 
this is a critical starting point for critical social analysis. Moreover, on an analytic level, Galtung‟s model  
recognises that there is a two-way relation between media systems and other spheres of society. The extent to 
which media systems are subject to the logics and norms of state, capital and civil society not only shape the 
way the media operate but also the shape of the relations among these respective spheres- there is a reflexive 
relationship between them. One important implication of this is that the evolving regulatory, financial and 
institutional arrangements underpinning the media can be regarded as an index of structural reconfigurations of 
the social totality.   
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Fig 1. Galtung’s model of media and social system 
 
Another approach to normative models of media system stems from Siebert et al.‟s seminal „four theories of the 
press‟. This proposed a 4-part typology of national media system; the authoritarian (state-controlled), the 
libertarian (free market), the social responsibility (watchdog/ public service
1
) and the Soviet (state communist). 
The limitations of these classifications have been rightly critiqued. For example, they cannot be applied with 
satisfactory validity to many empirical cases (particularly since the collapse of the Soviet Union) and the typology 
does not differentiate clearly between different media within any national media system. Hallin & Mancini (2004) 
have explicitly rejected the four theories model and propose a far more nuanced set of empirically validated 
classifications for media systems. The improvement in empirical accuracy is indisputable if the aim of the model 
is descriptive classification. However, consigning Siebert at al‟s typology to the academic dustbin may be 
premature. McQuail (1994) has suggested extending the four theories further to include a developmental model 
(state-led media in developing countries) and a democratic-participatory model (grass-roots/public access 
media).  McQuail‟s rationale is not to compound the analytic incongruity of the four theories but to deploy the 
extended classifications as normative ideal-types rather than empirical descriptors.  
 
Space precludes a detailed discussion of each model here, but one important issue arising from McQuail‟s 
extension is the differentiation of the social responsibility (and public service) model from the participatory model. 
As will become clear, this demarcates an important „fault-line‟ (see Goode, 2005) in the conception of the public 
and the arrangements through which the media supposedly facilitate the formation of a  public sphere. By 
mapping McQuail‟s typology onto Galtung‟s model, the contours of tension among these normative models can 
be highlighted (see fig. 2). Leaving aside the Soviet and development model in regard to capitalist industrial 
society, contemporary media policy trajectories can be mapped in respect to the prevailing discourses on the 
legitimate scope of state intervention, market liberalisation and civic engagement. At the same time, the 
configuration of relations among state, capital and civil society underpin the particular form of „policy settlement‟ 
(see Flew, 2006) realistically available at any particular historical conjunction. These will naturally vary across 
societies, but the macroeconomic shifts away from the Keynesian social democratic paradigm towards the 
Friedmanite neoliberal/ monetarist paradigm in many countries has entailed a redefinition of the relations 
between state and capital, the social contract between civil society and the state and the relation of the citizen to 
capital (particularly in respect to trade regimes developed in supranational forums operating beyond the confines 
of democratic representation).  
 
                                                 
1
 Siebert et al. did not include a public service model. Although their conception of social responsibility media may not imply 
the same institutional arrangements as European PSBs, they are suggested as analogous here insofar as they contrast 
commercially motivated media with those which have a sense of civic duty.  
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Fig.2 McQuail’s extended normative  typology mapped onto Galtung’s model 
 
These changes have had significant implications for public broadcasting arrangements, not least in New Zealand 
where the Rogernomics programme from the mid-1980s through the 1990s saw the break-up of BCNZ into 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the creation of one of the most deregulated and heavily commercialised 
media markets in the world. As the media‟s mode of engagement with civil society was shifting in emphasis 
away from meeting the needs of citizens towards meeting their ostensible demands as consumers (and thereby 
serving the imperatives of capital), so there was less space for media-facilitated public debate about the 
neoliberal reconfiguration of society (see Atkinson, 2004; Cocker, 1996; Hope, 1996). That said, it may be overly 
simplistic to characterise the changes in the New Zealand broadcasting ecology solely in terms of a one 
dimensional shift from the social responsibility to the libertarian model, reflecting capital‟s systemic colonisation 
of the lifeworld. Institutional specifics and countervailing trends must also be recognised. For example, the 
historical evidence of government interference in BCNZ suggests an undertone of authoritarianism which 
doubtless helped to legitimate moves toward market liberalism (see Cocker, 1996; Hope, 1996) and which 
continue to underpin a sensitivity to government involvement in broadcasting within the industry. Furthermore, it 
was the privatisation of the commercial stations under the Radio New Zealand set-up which ironically facilitated 
the establishment of RNZ as New Zealand‟s only dedicated public service broadcaster. These nuances 
complicate, but do not deny the dominant trajectory toward a libertarian-style model. Indeed, by the end of the 
1990s, TVNZ was being positioned for privatisation. This plan was interrupted by the election in 1999 of a new 
Labour-led government ostensibly promising a return to public service principles (Thompson 2000).  
 
Before proceeding to discuss the broadcasting policies introduced under Labour, it is necessary to clarify  the 
relation between the notions of public service and public sphere. Space again precludes exhaustive discussion, 
but one issue that deserves highlighting is the conception of the „public‟. As the combined McQuail/Galtung 
model indicates, there are different ways in which media might claim to serve the interests of civil society. Social 
responsibility or public service norms implicitly assume media functions that are not reducible to the imperatives 
of state or capital but adhere to the promotion or protection of the public interest as an end in its own right. 
However, insofar as such provisions are facilitated through professional institutions, media are not coterminous 
with civil society. In contrast with the participatory model where direct grass-roots civic engagement in the 
operation of the media is espoused, the social responsibility/public service model‟s civic function is ultimately a 
representative one whereby broadcasting professionals, possibly informed by a statutory remit or Charter, act in 
the public interest. This is one reason why the traditional Reithian approach to public service provision is 
frequently dismissed as a condescending, elitist imposition of middle class tastes and values upon the ignorant 
masses who must be subjected to the educational and informative virtues of public service for their own good. 
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Historically speaking, such resentment is perhaps justified, but such objections continue to inflect the rhetoric of 
the political right opposed to public service as a form of state intervention in a commercial market.  
 
On that point, it is interesting to note that Habermas‟ (1974, 1989) formulation of the bourgeois public sphere has 
in certain respects engendered a comparable line of critique (see for example, Fraser, 1992; McKee, 2005). 
Insofar as Habermas overstated the intrinsically progressive nature of the 18
th
 Century coffee house and the role 
of the (male) merchant class in the formation of civil society, much of this criticism is valid and largely 
acknowledged by Habermas (see Garnham, 2007). However, it is important not to disregard the historical 
context of this argument; for all its inequalities, the formation of the bourgeois public sphere nevertheless 
marked a significant structural shift away from feudalism toward democracy. Moreover, it is important to note that 
the structural transformation of the public sphere that Habermas (1974, 1989) delineates is an historical process 
in which the public qua civil society and the public‟s sense of their own interests are continuously renegotiated 
and rediscovered in an evolving social context (hence Habermas‟ contrast of the nascent bourgeois public 
sphere with the liberal model and the social welfare state/mass democracy model). As Habermas comments,  
 
‘By "the public sphere" we mean first of all a realm of our social life in which something approaching 
public opinion can be formed. […] A portion of the public sphere comes into being in every 
conversation in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. […] Citizens behave as a 
public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion-that is, with the guarantee of freedom of 
assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their opinions-about matters of 
general interest. In a large public body this kind of communication requires specific means for 
transmitting information and influencing those who receive it. Today newspapers and magazines, 
radio and television are the media of the public sphere […] The public sphere as a sphere which 
mediates between society and state, in which the public organizes itself as the bearer or public 
opinion, accords with the principle of the public sphere.’ (1974, p.49-50).  
 
The conception of the public sphere as the nexus between society and state bears some similarity to the role of 
the media system in Galtung‟s model. Given that Habermas recognised that mediating nexus evolves with 
society (hence the structural transformation argument), it is clear that the notion of the public sphere never 
assumed a static or homogeneous historical accomplishment. As with the Siebert et al/ McQuail  normative 
typologies, the analytic utility of the public sphere as a concept lies not in its empirical specificity but as an ideal 
type. As such, Habermas was right to signal the threat posed by private/commercial interests to the realisation of 
these ideals. The concerns about the refeudalisation of the public sphere as democratic deliberation and 
transparency become occluded by public relations are analogous to many contemporary concerns about the 
erosion of public service by media commercialisation (see Graham & Davis, 1997; Curran, 2000; Davis, 2002; 
Jakubowicz, 2004; Thompson, 2004; Comrie & Fountaine, 2005; Lealand, 2008).  There is certainly scope to 
draw parallels between the principles of the public sphere and those of public service (see fig.3 below).  
 
Public Sphere Principles Public Service Principles 2 
 Access guaranteed to all citizens  
 
 Universality of reception and audience 
appeal 
 Freedom to communicate opinions on 
public interest issues 
 
 Diversity of content and voices (including 
minorities) 
 Civic engagement distinct from state 
and market 
 
 Independent governance and public 
funding; citizen-focused 
 Unrestricted domain of critical-rational 
debate 
 
 Educate, inform, entertain; Impartiality & 
comprehensiveness 
 Transparency of political process/ 
deliberation 
 
 Watchdog functions- checks on those in 
power 
Fig. 3 Table comparing public sphere and public service principles 
 
                                                 
2
 This is not intended as a definitive set of public service values. Although the ones listed are not contentious, the criteria of 
public service have been subject to historical evolution and  ideological contestation, not least in New Zealand where it has 
been conflated at different times with public ownership of commercial media and local content provision (Thompson, 2004). 
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The notions of public sphere and public service are certainly related, but they are not coterminous. As noted 
earlier, an important fault-line that emerges here concerns the conception of the public, the relation between civil 
society and the media and by extension, the nature of representation between civil society and the state. 
Habermas‟ emphasis on the facilitation of active engagement of citizens in political life through rational dialogue 
among themselves is closer to the participatory model than the professionally-driven public service model; in this 
sense the formation of the public sphere must be accomplished by, not only for civil society. However, there is a 
difficulty here if a precondition of the public sphere is the very engaged rational citizenry that the public sphere is 
required to facilitate (see Fraser, 1992). Moreover, as Goode (2005) and Garnham (2007) suggest, Habermas‟ 
notion of the public sphere is not intended as a programme for radical civic direct action but as a means for 
discovering the socio-political conditions under which „solidarity among strangers‟ might be guaranteed without 
resorting to political violence. In that regard, the notion of the public sphere is not incompatible with mediated 
forms of civic representation in the political sphere.  
 
These points need not be interpreted as internal contradictions, however; in line with Galtung‟s model, the 
implication is that the form civil society takes is shaped by its positioning in relation to state and capital, the 
articulation of which in turn is shaped by the media nexus. Thus the form and function of the media system helps 
to extend or circumscribe the possibilities for civic engagement and the modality of political representation. 
Importantly, this suggests a need to distinguish between different conceptions of the public beyond the standard 
citizen-consumer dichotomy. As Winseck & Cuthbert (1997) have suggested, different institutional arrangements 
simultaneously engender and delimit the scope of democratic possibility. Forms of civic representation within an 
ostensibly democratic polity are entirely compatible with a heavily commercialised (libertarian) media system. 
Under a „limited democracy‟, public engagement in the decisions that will shape their lives consists primarily of 
the periodic opportunity to elect who will make those decisions from a narrow range of alternatives pre-defined 
by the political-economic elite. As such, the potential for progressive social change is minimal. In contrast, 
Winseck & Cuthbert also posit the notion of a „communicative democracy‟ characterised by direct and regular 
civic involvement in political decision-making and a participatory model of media accountable to civil society, with 
a higher potential for progressive social change. Between the limited and communicative forms, Winseck & 
Cuthbert (1997) also identify a „pragmatic‟ form of democracy which would allow a moderate degree of civic 
participation in political process within an elite-led representative polity and media system. However, a key 
implication of this model is that representative forms of media system, including public service, simultaneously 
facilitate civic engagement to a degree compatible with the prevailing configuration of relations with state and 
capital while circumscribing or diluting more radical options for social change. 
 
In practice, most western societies with some form of public service media have fallen somewhere between the 
limited and pragmatic forms of democracy. Although the potential for new digital media and the internet to 
enhance political participation in line with communicative/participatory models or facilitate progressive social 
movements should not be discounted, it is often overstated (for a critique see Hoar & Hope, 2002). The 
proliferation of new digital media platforms has also allowed the expansion of commercial media interests and 
created an environment in which competition for revenue intensifies, increasing the opportunity costs for public 
service provision and amplifying industry demands for deregulation and release from any obligation to serve the 
public interest in a manner incompatible with maximising revenue. Indeed, one important policy trend is the 
demands for increasingly specific designations of public service media provisions in order to quarantine their 
scope of operation and levels of funding and prioritise the rights of private commercial media to expand their 
operations onto new platforms (Jakubowicz, 2004; Freedman, 2008). The evolving digital media ecology has led 
some academic commentators to argue that traditional notions of public service broadcasting are either 
outmoded or no longer politically meaningful (see, for example, Jacka, 2003; Flew, 2006). Although there is 
certainly reason to interrogate how public service outcomes are delivered in the digital age, there are compelling 
arguments that the propensity for market failure and consequent need for intervention increases in the digital 
media environment (see Graham & Davis, 1997).  
 
The democratic potential of digital media developments need to be understood in the broader context of the 
prevailing neoliberal policy trajectory. Crucially, this has not been fundamentally diverted by the re-emergence of 
centre-left governments espousing a return to social-democratic principles. In many cases, these administrations 
have adopted a „third way‟ paradigm in which progressive civic values such as public service are openly 
celebrated but in practice, implemented in whatever policy spaces remain after neo-liberal market imperatives 
have been accommodated (Thompson, 2000; see also Comrie & Fountaine, 2006). The broadcasting reforms of 
the three Labour-led governments in New Zealand between 1999-2008 provide an apposite demonstration of 
this tendency and also serve to show how public service broadcasting and the public sphere have been 
compromised by efforts to pursue social democratic policy outcomes through market mechanisms.  
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Normative tensions in broadcasting policy in NZ 
 
The preceding overview of the normative conceptions of media system will be illustrated in the context of the 
broadcasting policy developments in New Zealand since 1999. As noted, the period from the mid-1980s to the 
end of the 1990s had seen the emergence of one of the most heavily commercialised and liberalised media 
markets in the world.  Not surprisingly, Labour‟s plans to reform broadcasting and return to some form of public 
service provision immediately came under challenge from the private media sector and the political right. Labour 
explicitly recognised the market failures of a heavily liberalised commercial media sector but its third way 
approach led to difficulties reconciling public service and commercial media imperatives and its efforts to re-
regulate focused primarily on the state broadcasters, leaving the commercial operators largely alone (see 
Thompson, 2000; Comrie & Fountaine, 2006). Important policy tensions emerged among the Ministry for Culture 
& Heritage (MCH), the Treasury and the Ministry for Economic Development (MED) which all had rather different 
priorities for the sector, and these were further complicated by the shifting interests of various broadcasting 
actors. The centrepiece of Labour‟s broadcasting reforms was the 2003 restructuring of TVNZ  as a Crown 
Company with a dual remit comprising of a wide-ranging public service Charter and a continuing expectation of 
commercial dividends. This was accompanied by a government commitment to provide an extremely modest 
direct subsidy to TVNZ (up to NZ$15m per year, representing around 4 to 5% of its operational expenses). 
Importantly, the range of public service functions covered by the Charter extended beyond the local content 
genres subsidised by NZ On Air, and this was made explicit in MCH advice on the Charter funding to the 
Minister (Thompson, 2004).  
 
The move to implement even this limited level of direct funding was opposed by several institutional 
stakeholders. Because TVNZ remained dependent on commercial revenue (90% after both Charter money and 
content commissioned through NZ On Air) it continued to compete directly for substitutable audience share and 
advertising revenue. Consequently, its private commercial rivals understandably regarded the direct Charter 
subsidy as constituting market distortion because, unlike the NZ On Air contestable fund, they were ineligible to 
apply for a share.  Mediaworks (the operator of TV3 and C4 as well as a range of radio stations, currently owned 
by Ironbridge Capital) was particularly aggrieved. As its (then) CEO,  Brent Impey argued, ‘Do we really believe 
the Charter was meant to provide an unfair advantage so the state broadcaster can take local programming from 
other broadcasters?… [TVNZ] seems more interested in beating the competition instead of adding to the fabric 
of New Zealand’  (Impey, 2003).  Meanwhile, the independent production sector lobby was concerned about the 
direct funding for the Charter because they considered this a revenue stream that would be retained for TVNZ in-
house productions rather than made available to external bids. NZ On Air, was also privately concerned about 
the Charter appropriation, because they regarded direct broadcaster funding as an important policy shift away 
from their own contestable fund model and hence a threat to their institutional status- not least because TVNZ 
was lobbying to have its contestable fund redirected to Charter functions on the pretext that it was the only 
television operator with such obligations. Nevertheless, Thompson (2004, 2007) has pointed out that the 
demands of the Treasury for continued dividend payments meant that TVNZ was literally being given money 
through the MCH only for the Treasury to claim it back, leaving it with a net subsidy that was actually negative 
3
.  
TVNZ‟s performance in delivering the Charter can certainly be questioned. There were undeniably problems with 
transparency and accountability in the deployment of the Charter funding. Some of the money was combined 
with NZ On Air funding to fund programme production, conflating their complementary functions. Furthermore, 
some Charter funds went towards the subsidy of programmes which pre-existed the Charter, which could hardly 
be construed as extending the range of content. Nevertheless TVNZ did make an effort to produce content 
consistent with the Charter that it would never have attempted to do as a commercial state-owned enterprise. 
Programmes like Face to Face, Agenda, Eye to Eye (and the new Q&A) clearly addressed Charter goals, even if 
they were screened at times where they would pose no risk to the commercial schedule. The coverage of the 
memorial proceedings for Sir Edmund Hillary, the Maori Queen, and the Unknown Warrior would never have 
been so extensive without the motivation of TVNZ‟s Charter.  
                                                 
3
 It is interesting to note that while these political tensions were unfolding, the legitimacy of two other public sector 
broadcasters was left largely unquestioned. Radio New Zealand‟s direct subsidy (administered by NZ On Air, and at over 
NZ$30m, twice the level of the TVNZ Charter subsidy) was not (then) perceived to be distorting the market because RNZ did 
not compete for substitutable audience share and commercial revenue
3
. Meanwhile, the Maori Television Service 
(established in 2003) receives funding from both the Ministry for Maori Affairs Te Mangai Paho (the Maori equivalent of NZ 
On Air), each worth approximately NZ$16-17m per annum. Although MTS does carry a small amount of advertising, this 
represents less than 5% of its revenue (almost the inverse of the TVNZ ratio). However, because MTS‟s primary function is 
the promotion of Te Reo (the indigenous language) it is likewise not generally regarded as competing for substitutable 
audience share and revenue.  
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Meanwhile, the efforts to harden up the focus of news and current affairs and include more regional and 
international reporting saw the departures of star presenters and shake-ups in the format, that also led to 
slippage in the ratings. That loss of market share was met with vehement criticism from the political right and 
media commentators whose only yardstick of performance was audience share and advertising revenue. In the 
end, even the government joined in the criticism, and TVNZ quickly realised that failing to deliver the Charter 
attracted far less political flak than failing to maintain ratings and revenue.  
The fundamental problem with the Charter was always the dual remit, by which TVNZ had to deliver the Charter 
outcomes at the same time as maintaining commercial performance and paying a dividend to the Crown. In 
practice, this resulted in the Ministry for Culture and Heritage giving it money with one hand only for the Treasury 
to take it back with the other. Between 2003 and 2008, TVNZ received $95 million in Charter funding but 
returned $142 million in dividends. Even with the availability of NZ On Air funds, TVNZ remained 90% dependent 
on commercial revenue streams for its operations. Although there are other public service broadcaster 
arrangements which combine public and commercial revenue (e.g. RTE in Ireland), none have had such a low 
ratio of public funding. Consequently, the $15m was never sufficient to offset the opportunity costs and insulate 
programming and scheduling decisions from commercial pressure and market failure.  
On top of this was an unstated third imperative; the implicit expectation of the government that TVNZ, as the 
centrepiece of Labour‟s public broadcasting strategy, would help maintain the public credibility of those policies. 
Apart from the „no surprises‟ requirement (which led to tensions between TVNZ‟s board and management after 
the messy scandals over its star presenters‟ salary negotiations and leaks from the Board) this also meant that 
TVNZ was obliged to play its part in a political charade whereby the government pretended to fund the Charter 
and TVNZ pretended to deliver it. Thus in addition to the dual commercial and public service remit, TVNZ was 
also juggling a capricious set of political expectations. By the end of 2005, CEO Ian Fraser had resigned with the 
memorable lamentation that continuing commercial pressures had resulted in a schedule ‘profoundly 
incompatible with any recognisable model of public broadcasting’ (see Thompson, 2007). The tensions TVNZ 
was subjected to can be illustrated by mapping these pressures onto Galtung‟s model (see fig 4 below). 
 
 
Fig. 4 TVNZ Charter tensions mapped onto Galtung’s model 
 
 
Meanwhile, the challenges to TVNZ‟s public service provisions continued in regard to  digital television. 
Interestingly, its self-proclaimed mission of „inspiring on every screen‟ and extending its services online (and via 
cellphone) through programme catch-up services (TVNZ Ondemand) has proven to be remarkably 
uncontroversial in contrast with the concerns surrounding the BBC‟s expansion of services. However, TVNZ‟s 
lead role in the development of the NZ version of the digital Freeview platform has not escaped controversy. The 
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government regarded Freeview as an important initiative to encourage household take-up of digital reception 
technology in preparation for the (still unspecified) digital switchover. To this end, it agreed to invest NZ$25m in 
supporting the technical infrastructure developments and provide free spectrum licences to operators. However, 
there was political disagreement behind the government‟s decision to allocate NZ$79m over six years to fund its 
two new commercial-free digital channels, TVNZ 6 and TVNZ 7 and help drive the uptake of Freeview.  
 
Despite the fact that this funding largely comprised the drip-fed return of a special NZ$70m dividend TVNZ paid 
to the Treasury as part of a 2006 capital restructuring exercise, different ministerial imperatives threatened to 
derail the initiative. As Thompson (2007) points out, the MCH supported the subsidy because the commercial-
free TVNZ 6 and 7 would enable the development of distinctive schedules to enhance Charter provisions 
(although the funding streams were to be kept separate). The MED also supported the subsidy, but this was 
premised on an independent report showing that an early analogue switch off by 2015 would help stimulate the 
digital media sector representing over NZ$200m in economic growth. The Treasury, however, initially refused to 
approve the funding, arguing that it did not regard the investment as good value for money. High level cabinet 
negotiations and recognition that the TVNZ dividend would decline if it was obliged to subsidise both channels 
from its commercial revenue eventually pushed the decision in TVNZ‟s favour. This is indicative of the how the 
complex institutional tensions underpin policy, but also how the normative pressures of different imperatives for 
public broadcasting are articulated.  
 
Nevertheless, when the funding decision was announced, it was immediately criticised by Mediaworks which 
complained that the subsidy constituted market distortion. Brent Impey suggested TVNZ‟s funding represented 
„the use of taxpayer funding to subsidise a failing commercial business- it essentially amounts to a bail-out‟ 
(Impey, 2006), while Rick Friesen, the head of TV3, argued that they would have been willing to provide a 
service comparable to TVNZ 6 and 7 had they been permitted to bid for it (Friesen, 2007). These arguments are 
significant because they represent a shift in the normative assumptions underpinning the legitimation of PSM 
provisions in the private commercial sector.  Mediaworks‟ criticism was aimed at commercial free PSM services 
on a platform that was still very limited in audience uptake and would not be competing for substitutable 
audience share or advertising revenue. This suggests an increasing sense of entitlement, implicitly assuming 
that any and all PSM funding distorts the market unless it is made contestable. Interestingly, it is the 
contestability rather than the actual allocation that appears to be the point of contention- the normative 
assumption is that unless the private media sector has equal access to any public broadcasting revenues then 
there is market distortion. By 2008, TVNZ‟s Charter and public funding arrangements had been roundly criticised 
by the government, the opposition and its commercial rivals. The government moved to give NZ On Air 
jurisdiction over the Charter funding, but the subsequent election result took broadcasting policy in another 
direction.  
 
Broadcasting policy developments under National: Same thing only different? 
 
In November 2008, a new National-led government came into office. It moved quickly to redirect the $15m 
Charter funding (which had never been hypothecated in the 2003 TVNZ Act). to NZ On Air, establishing a 
second contestable „Platinum Fund‟ to enable commissioning of more specific PSB-type content (NZ On Air, 
2010). This was welcomed by NZ On Air as well the independent production sector and TVNZ‟s commercial 
rivals. The Minister of broadcasting has argued that in the digital broadcasting environment, platform neutrality 
means there is no need for a dedicated PSM provider so long as high quality content is made available (Media 
7, 2009). The new fund, however, remains subject to many of the structural limitations of the local content fund in 
that proposals require an agreement to broadcast and cannot ensure content decision are insulated from the 
imperatives of commercial scheduling.  
 
Another recent development has been the commercial radio sector‟s challenges to Radio New Zealand‟s 
requests for additional public funding to maintain its services. The government informed RNZ that its funding was 
to be frozen and would need to deliver more operational efficiency to meet its budget restriction, citing the 
economic downturn as necessitating austerity. However, RNZ cited an independent report by KPMG (2007) 
commissioned by the MCH that concluded that RNZ was already highly efficient in its budgeting and was 
actually chronically under-funded.  Brent Impey commented that it was „galling‟ and „outrageous‟ for a public 
broadcaster to ask for additional funding while its commercial rivals were suffering declining incomes in a tight 
economic environment, and suggested that public sector media ought to have their funding cut by 15-20% to 
level the playing field with the commercial sector (quoted in Drinnan, 2009). Interestingly, these objections are 
aimed at a heretofore non-contentious public revenue stream which funds a dedicated public broadcaster not 
competing for substitutable audience or revenue. Indeed, Impey even argued that public service media ought to 
be penalised to help compensate the private sector for the downturn in commercial revenues. Thus the private 
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media sector is responding to shifts in the commercial value chain by claiming a natural right to priority access to 
any and all audiences and revenue streams: Public service must stand aside to accommodate the imperative of 
private capital accumulation.  
 
Meanwhile, the government‟s Television New Zealand Amendment Bill has scheduled the Charter for abolition in 
2010. However, the amendment bill does not return TVNZ to SOE status, and retains some generic PSB 
requirements including universal service and content range and quality. National has indicated that it wishes to 
retain TVNZ 6 and/or 7 in some form, but has thus far been unwilling to commit to funding them, and speculation 
continues about what form this might take. The channels are not currently eligible for the NZ on Air funds and if 
they move to a commercial funding base, the distinctive character of their schedules will be eroded.  It appears 
that the government does not wish to be seen to publicly abandon any commitment to public service altogether 
but remains unwilling to either fund or be held accountable for the full range of public service functions required 
by the Charter. The abolition of the TVNZ Charter certainly represents a serious normative shift and a further 
dilution of the media‟s civic accountability. Interestingly, in contrast to the EU scenario where the public service 
quarantined by increasingly specific definitions of legitimate functions (Jakubowicz, 2004), National‟s strategy 
appears to involves circumscription of public service through strategic ambiguity, leaving TVNZ accountable to 
nothing except the government‟s transitory policy priorities. There is therefore substantial normative confusion 
underpinning these policy developments, in part reflecting the same ministerial tensions that underpinned the 
policy compromises that led to the contradictions of the TVNZ Charter.  
 
National‟s predilection for a market-driven approach to broadcasting is nevertheless becoming clear in other 
ways. The government‟s decision to abandon a major planned review of regulations for digital broadcasting and 
content appears to reflect an active aversion to investigating policy issues which might demand regulatory 
intervention in the market, particularly in regard to Sky. TVNZ was encouraged to abandon its long-standing 
refusal to allow TVNZ 6 and 7 to be carried on Sky‟s platform. Although this ostensibly increases public value by 
reaching a wider audience, it also weakens the distinctiveness of the Freeview platform TVNZ had championed 
as the FTA alternative to Sky. Moreover, TVNZ‟s recent decision to launch its new archived content channel 
„Heartland‟ exclusively on Sky‟s platform effectively means that half the households in New Zealand will be 
disenfranchised from their own televisual heritage unless they subscribe to a foreign pay-TV provider. As John 
Fellett, CEO of Sky TV succinctly commented, „This vault of content which includes some of New Zealand‟s most 
beloved shows is the biggest untapped resource since the Maui oil fields‟ (Sky, 2010). TVNZ will profit from the 
venture, but this move clearly involves the transformation of a public good into a private one.  
 
Conclusions- Last Chance to See? 
 
The normative tensions that have pulled broadcasting policy in new Zealand in different directions are 
underpinned partly by the alignments and tensions among specific institutional interests in the media ecology, 
including government, various media/industry actors and different ministerial imperatives. Nevertheless, these 
developments need to be understood in the context of the social totality. Despite three terms in office, Labour 
proved unable or unwilling to implement sufficiently bold broadcasting policies to divert the NZ media policy from 
the neoliberal trajectory of the 1990s. The pursuit of public broadcasting policies within the confines of a third 
way agenda proceeded on the basis that policy development not aligned to the continued macroeconomic 
default to fiscal conservatism was effectively not available as a democratic alternative. The prevailing libertarian 
model of media has not permitted informed public debate around these issues to develop and indeed, served to 
delegitimate initiatives such as the TVNZ Charter. Without the political will to challenge the neoliberal 
macroeconomic paradigm, the potential for media policy to foster the development of public service provisions 
was severely constrained. 
 
Despite expectations that the National government would revert to the wholesale neoliberalism of the 1990s, its 
stance on broadcasting policy has been rather more ambivalent. The haste with which Labour‟s policy reforms 
including the TVNZ Charter and the Review of Regulation for digital broadcasting were abandoned has left the 
government uncertain of its own policy commitments. Although its default policy perspective will be aligned to 
neoliberal macroeconomics, there are signs of similar policy tensions of the form Labour found so difficult to 
manage. There may be little realistic hope that National will commit to any significant form of public service 
provision other maintaining the remnants of TVNZ 6 & 7, an under-funded RNZ and the Maori TV service. It is 
unclear whether National might move to privatise TVNZ if it were to gain a second term in office, but the 
possibility cannot be disregarded. Such moves would have dire consequences for the future of broadcasting in 
New Zealand. The notions of public service and public sphere may be unfashionable in contemporary academic 
circles, but unless critical academic voices are willing to articulate their virtues, then we risk becoming complicit 
witnesses to their final demise. It may be our last chance to see… 
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